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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
CHESTER MATHIS, 
Respondent, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8375 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 18, 1957 in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, the appellant was convicted of a crime and sen-
tenced to a term in the Utah State Prison. For the purpose 
of this brief, respondent adopts the facts as described on 
pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POW-
ERS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A 
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL. 
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POINT II 
THE CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL GRANTED 
TO THE STATE DID NOT DEPRIVE APPEL-
LANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
A "SPEEDY TRIAL". 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
GRANTING THE CONTINUANCE TO THE 
STATE, IT WAS HARMLESS AND NOT PREJ-
UDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF 
THE APPELLANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POW-
ERS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A 
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL. 
There is strong and numerous authority in this state 
for the proposition that the granting of a continuance is a 
question within the discretion of the trial court. 
"Whether a postponement of the trial should or 
should not be granted on showing made is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court, and a denial 
of postponement will not be regarded as reversible 
error unless clearly prejudicial." State v. Fairclough 
(1935 Utah) 44 P. 2d 692. 
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See also State v. Williams (1917 Utah) 163 P. 1104, State 
v. Cano (1924 Utah) 228 P. 563, and State v. Anselmo (1915 
Utah) 148 P. 1071. 
In State v. Hartman (1941 Utah) 119 P. 2d 112, a case 
cited by appellant, the trial court had denied defendant's 
motion for a continuance and he appealed. This court said, 
at page 114: 
"The granting of a continuance in a criminal 
case is discretionary with the court and its refusal 
to grant a continuance is not reversible error unless 
clearly prejudicial." 
In the cited case, the defendant had been denied a contin-
uance at trial and appealed on that basis. We have found 
no Utah cases where appeal has been sustained on the 
ground that it was error to grant the state a continuance. 
POINT II 
THE CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL GRANTED 
TO THE STATE DID NOT DEPRIVE APPEL-
LANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
A "SPEEDY TRIAL". 
As appellant declares at the outset of his second point 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4) the substantive question here is 
whether granting the continuance amounted to a violation 
of appellant's constitutional rights. More precisely, it is 
whether appellant was denied his right to a "speedy trial". 
Trial was set for June 5, and on that date on the state's 
motion, it was continued to June 18, a delay of 13 days. 
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The constitutional guarantee of a "speedy trial", as 
other guarantees, is based on experience and good reason; 
to prevent arbitrary delays in the prosecution of criminal 
actions often resulting in lost evidence and faulty convic-
tions, and to prevent long imprisonment of accused persons 
before trial. Constitution of the United States, John Ran-
dolph Tucker, ( 1899) . Its ancestry may be traced far back 
into the history of English criminal law where early at-
tempts were made to prevent extended imprisonment be-
fore trial. An old and oft cited decision describes the right 
in general. 
"Nor does a speedy trial mean a trial immed-
iately upon the presentation of the indictment or the 
arrest upon it, but simply means that the trial shall 
take place as soon as possible after the indictment 
is found, without depriving the prosecution a reason-
able time for preparation. The law is the embodi-
ment of reason and good sense; * * * ." Ex parte 
Stanley, 1868 Nev. 4 Nev. 113. 
Speaking generally of the right to a "speedy trial" Justice 
McKenna said in Beavers v. Haubert: 
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily rela-
tive, it is consistent with delays and depends upon 
circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant, it 
does not preclude the rights of public justice." 1905 
198 U. S. 77, 25 S. Ct. 573. 
See also Nixon v. State, 2 S & M (Miss.) 507, and Stewart 
v. State (1853 Ark.) 13 Ark. 720. 
Appellant's argument begins by asserting as a founda-
tion the "speedy trial" guarantee of the Utah constitution 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5). The argument then seeks in addi-
tion to rely on two sections of the Utah Code of Criminal 
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Procedure which are quoted, 77-24-18 and 77-29-1. The first 
prohibits undue postponement in trial and the second pro-
vides the means by which a postponement or continuance 
may be obtained. Appellant asserts that the continuance 
granted the state was improper because the procedure de-
scribed in Section 77-29-1 is not strictly complied with, i. e. 
that there was not sufficient cause shown by affidavit. Here 
the argument assumes a double front; on the one hand that 
the delay amounted to a deprivation of the right to a "speedy 
trial", and on the other that the failure to comply strictly 
with Section 77-29-1 violated due process. The due process 
argument is not properly before the court. The failure to 
comply with required criminal procedure does not in every 
instance constitute a violation of due process. The proced-
ure followed may have been error, but it was not prejudi-
cial to substantive rights. If the situation had been re-
versed and appellant had been denied a continuance, then 
the question of due process could likely be raised. 
The core of the problem and the real substantive issue, 
as stated above, is whether the delay as a result of the 
continuance, deprived appellant of his right to a "speedy 
trial". The necessity of a workable definition of the term 
"speedy trial" is apparent. Appellant did not cite in his brief 
a section of the Utah code which we feel is likely determina-
tive of this problem. Section 77-51-1 reads: 
"Dismissal for failure to prosecute.-The court, 
unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must 
order the prosecution to be dismissed in the follow-
ing cases: 
" ( 1) When a person has been held to answer 
for a public offense, if an information is not filed 
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nor an indictment found against him at the next 
term of the court at which he is held to answer. 
"(2) If the defendant, whose trial has not been 
postponed upon his application, is not brought to 
trial at the next term of the court in which the in-
formation or indictment is triable after it is filed 
or found." 
This section is mandatory and requires the dismissal of the 
prosecution unless the conditions enumerated are complied 
with. Those conditions are time limitations within which 
the information must be filed and the defendant tried. Sev-
eral states have similar code provisions providing that if 
the time limits are not complied with the cause shall be 
dismissed or the prisoner discharged. In the cases we have 
found, the courts have interpreted these mandatory time 
guarantees as being supplemental to and definitive of the 
right to a "speedy trial" as guaranteed in state constitu-
tions. 
In Ex parte Trull (1931 Kans.) 298 P. 775, the infor-
mation was filed about two and one-half years after arrest, 
and the Kansas Supreme Court was dealing with a section 
of the code similar to ours which provided a maximum per-
iod beyond which an accused person could not be held and 
providing that at the expiration of said period the person 
so held shall be discharged. In considering this code section 
together with the "speedy trial" provision of the constitu-
tion the court said: 
"It is generally held that the statutes supple-
ment the constitution and are to be regarded as 
rendering the constitutional guarantee effective and 
constitute a legislative definition of what is, under 
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the circumstances named, a reasonable and proper 
delay in bringing the accused to trial." 
This principle followed an earlier Kansas decision, see In 
re McMicken (Kans.) 18 P. 473. 
California also follows this interpretation. In In re 
Begerow, (1901 Cal.) 65 P. 828, a case quoted by appellant, 
the petitioner was discharged because he had been held for 
more than 60 days in violation of the code. The California 
Penal Code, Section 1382, provides that the court, unless 
for good cause shown, must dismiss the prosecution when 
an accused, if trial has not been postponed on his applica-
tion, has not been to trial within 60 days· after indictment. 
The court in speaking of this statutory provision in the 
light of the "speedy trial" guarantee, said : 
"The statute is a construction of the constitu-
tional provision, so far as to indicate what is a rea-
sonable time within which a case should be brought 
to trial, in order that the constitutional guarantee 
may be kept. And it may be fairly interpreted to be 
that this guarantee is violated whenever 60 days is 
allowed to elapse without a trial; * * * " 
Oklahoma courts have held similarly that the constitu-
tional provision guaranteeing a "speedy trial" is a term of 
indeterminate meaning and permits legislative definition 
to some extent. See Application of Hayes (1956 Okla.) 301 
P. 2d 701. See also State v. Keefe (1908) 98 P. 122, a Wy-
oming case, which also adopts this principle in defining 
the constitutional guarantee. 
There are two significant Utah decisions discussing the 
requirements of Section 77-51-1 above quoted, as it applies 
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to the right to a "speedy trial." In State v. Endsley, (1899 
Utah) 57 P. 430, the defendant appealed on the ground that 
the trial was not held at ~he next term after filing the in-
formation as required by Section 5065 Revised Statutes 
1898 (Section 5065 is identical to above quoted section 
77-51-1). This court sa:id: 
"Doubtless by this statute the legislature in-
tended to secure to every defendant in a criminal 
prosecution a speedy trial, in the absence of good 
cause being shown for delay; * * * " 
In State v. Rutledge (1922 Utah) 227 P. 479, an appeal 
was taken to the Supreme Court on the ground that after 
the defendant had been committed, the district attorney 
failed to file an information within the period required by 
Section 9345 Com. Laws of Utah 1917, identical to present 
Section 77-51-1. The appellant asserted that the delay vio-
lated the defendant's right to a "speedy trial". This court 
said: 
"The right of an accused person to have a 
speedy public trial (Const. of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 12) 
so far as the filing of the information is concerned, 
is secured by Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, Section 
9345, * * *" 
Obviously the trial in this case was within the time 
period described in Section 77-51-1, and appellant's right 
to a "speedy trial" was not violated. The information was 
filed on May 16 (R. 6) and trial was held on June 18, both 
within the April term of the court. 
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POINT III 
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
GRANTING THE CONTINUANCE TO THE 
STATE, IT WAS HARMLESS AND NOT PREJ-
UDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF 
THE APPELLANT. 
On the basis of the state's motion for a continuance, 
trial was postponed from June 5th to June 18th, a period 
of less than two weeks. If it can be said that granting the 
continuance was error, how can it reasonably be asserted 
that such a brief delay prejudiced the appellant. It would 
be another thing if, as pointed out in Point II above, it had 
been the defendant's request for continuance that had been 
denied. The delay which resulted in this case is certainly 
not the long delay or extended imprisonment which the fram-
ers of the constitution intended to prevent by inserting a 
provision guaranteeing the right to a "speedy trial". 
Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is a codi-
fication of that principle of appellate review holding that 
a cause will not be reversed for error or defect unless the 
substantive rights of the accused are effected. 
This court in 1953 in State v. Neal, 262 P. 2d 756, de-
clared: 
"We will not reverse criminal causes for mere 
error or irregularities. It is only when there has 
been error which is both substantial and prejudicial 
to the rights of the accused that a reversal is war-
ranted." 
For a similar ruling, see State v. Justenson, 35 Utah 
105, 99 P. 456. Section 77-29-1 is relied on by appellant 
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and quoted in his brief. It prescribes a procedural require-
ment. But failure to comply with the section is not error 
unless the appellant is prejudiced and his substantive right 
effected. We have found no cases, nor has appellant cited 
any, wherein a conviction was reversed on the ground of 
failure to comply with Section 77-29-1. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case before the court, the information was filed 
on May 16th. Appellant was arraigned on May 17th and 
trial was had on June 18th, all within the same term of 
court. We have been unable to find any cases reversing a 
conviction on the grounds alleged here and under circum-
stances similar to this case. In Utah, Section 77-51-1 
amounts to a supplement and a legislative definition of the 
right to a "speedy trial". In cases cited by appellant and in 
those we have found, reversals were based on a failure to 
grant a continuance to the defendant or on the ground that 
the delays in trial violated code provisions similar to Sec-
tion 77-51-1. This statute was not violated in the case be-
fore the court. It is respectfully submitted that the judg-
ment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
GARY L. THEURER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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